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S overeign wealth funds have emerged as major investors in corporate and real resources worldwide. Estimates of their size are diffi cult, because disclo-sure regulations and practices differ widely from country to country. But in 
2012, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimated that total assets of these funds 
were more than $5 trillion: that is, more than double the $2.1 trillion managed by 
hedge funds (as estimated by Hedge Funds Research Inc., accessed July 21, 2012), 
although it is only 2.3 percent of the $212 trillion in total global fi nancial assets 
(as estimated by McKinsey Global Institute 2011).
At fi rst blush, sovereign wealth funds might seem an excellent opportunity 
for nations with high variance in public revenues to ensure steady cash fl ow levels 
and provide resources for long-term investments: for example, countries relying on 
commodity trade that occasionally encounter windfalls of natural resources. Such 
countries, without a fund to direct investments, could otherwise fall prey to the 
“Dutch disease” and squander short-lived windfalls from natural resources in a way 
that weakens the economy’s long-run potential. But sovereign wealth funds also 
have limitations, since they may create economic distortions. For example, there 
are concerns about lack of transparency and political capture: funds with political 
leaders on their boards may be tempted to shore-up domestic fi rms as they succumb 
to political pressure, passing up on high net present value investments in other 
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fi rms and creating product market distortions by favoring connected or poorly 
performing fi rms. Similarly, as the interaction between sovereign wealth funds and 
political agenda grows, opportunities for nepotism increase, potentially reducing 
the overall skill of sovereign wealth fund managers relative to professionals and 
diluting the returns.
Thus, sovereign wealth funds are particularly interesting because of the poten-
tial interactions between mission and ownership structure. Their investment charters 
usually state that the fund seeks to maximize fi nancial returns for the benefi t of 
long-term public policies, such as retiree benefi ts or economic development needs. 
But the quasi-public nature of these funds means that they are exposed to political 
infl uences, often with more short-term goals.
This article will review several of the central issues that face sovereign wealth 
funds. After an overview of their magnitude, we will then consider the institutional 
arrangements under which many of the sovereign wealth funds operate and how 
such arrangements might infl uence the effectiveness of their investment policies. We 
focus on a specifi c set of agency problems that is of fi rst-order importance for these 
funds: that is, the direct involvement of political leaders in the management process. 
We show that sovereign wealth funds with greater involvement of political leaders in 
fund management are associated with investment strategies that seem to favor short-
term economic policy goals in their respective countries at the expense of longer-term 
maximization of returns. In particular, sovereign wealth funds where political involve-
ment is more prevalent tend to support domestic fi rms by investing in segments and 
markets where valuation levels are infl ated (as measured by price/earnings ratios), 
and subsequently see a reversal in these price/earnings ratios. The opposite patterns 
hold for funds that rely on external managers. While we are not able to disentangle 
causality with our existing data, the associations are striking.
Sovereign wealth funds face several other issues, like how best to cope with 
demands for transparency, which can allow others to copy their investment strate-
gies, and how to address the problems that arise with sheer size, like the diffi culties 
of scaling up investment strategies that only work with a smaller value of assets 
under investment. In the conclusion, we discuss how various approaches cultivated 
by effective institutional investors worldwide—from investing in the best people 
to pioneering new asset classes to compartmentalizing investment activities—may 
provide clues as to how sovereign wealth funds might address these issues.
An Overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Depending on how one counts, there are between 40 and 70 different sovereign 
funds, run by political entities as disparate as New Mexico and Kazakhstan. Table 1 
lists the 20 largest sovereign wealth funds and estimates of their holdings: the funds 
on this list comprise about 90 percent of the total assets of sovereign wealth funds. 
The wealth within these funds has differing origins. In many of the most visible 
cases, such as Abu Dhabi, petroleum has been the source of abundant wealth. Other 
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commodities, from diamonds to copper or phosphates, have been the foundation 
of other funds, like the Chilean sovereign fund (though none of these funds made 
it onto the list of the top 20 funds). Still others have been primarily funded from the 
proceeds from the sale of state-owned properties or businesses. Other funds, such as 
those of China and Singapore, have their origin in trade surpluses.
Sovereign wealth funds are growing quickly. They increased ten-fold in the last 
two decades: from $500 billion in 1990 to more than $5 trillion today. Over the 
past three years, they have achieved a 24 percent annual growth rate. Much of this 
growth has been driven (not surprisingly) by the rising price of petroleum, and has 
been concentrated in producer nations such as Norway, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Kuwait. But other important players include nations such as China that pile up 
foreign currency because they run persistent, large trade surpluses. These countries 
less and less often put these reserves “under a mattress”—that is, holding safe but 
low-return US Treasury bonds — and are instead seeking broader portfolios.
Sovereign funds frequently have multiple goals, which different organizations 
emphasize to varying extents. There are three distinct roles sovereign wealth funds 
Table 1
Leading Sovereign Wealth Funds
Country Fund Name
Assets 
(billions 
of dollars) Inception Origin of wealth
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627 1976 Oil
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global 593 1990 Oil
China SAFE Investment Company 568 1997 Non-commodity
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 533 N/A Oil
China China Investment Corporation 440 2007 Non-commodity
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 296 1953 Oil
China – Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
 Investment 
293 1993 Non-commodity
Singapore Government of Singapore 
 Investment Corporation
248 1981 Non-commodity
Singapore Temasek Holdings 158 1974 Non-commodity
Russia National Welfare Fund 150 2008 Oil
China National Social Security Fund 135 2000 Non-commodity
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 100 2005 Oil
Australia Australian Future Fund 80 2006 Non-commodity
UAE – Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 70 2006 Oil
UAE – Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment 
 Company
65 1984 Oil
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 65 2006 Oil
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 58 2000 Oil
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 57 2000 Oil
UAE – Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company 48 2002 Oil
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation 43 2005 Non-commodity
Note: This information about the 20 largest sovereign wealth funds is compiled from the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, http://www.swfi nstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (accessed July 21, 2012).
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can play. First, they can serve as a source of capital for future generations, especially 
in countries where future generations may no longer be able to rely on commodi-
ties for a steady stream of revenue. For example, the nation of Kiribati is a collection 
of islands in the Pacifi c Ocean (formerly known as the Gilbert Islands) with a popu-
lation of under 100,000 residents. For many decades, the dominant export from 
the country was guano, bird droppings used for fertilizer. The island’s leaders set 
up the Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund in 1956, and imposed a tax on 
production by foreign fi rms. The last guano was extracted in 1979, but the fund 
remains a key economic contributor. At $600 million, it is ten times the size of 
the nation’s gross domestic product, and the interest generated by the fund repre-
sents 30 percent of the nation’s revenue. Such a use is similar to that of a university 
that receives a major bequest: typically, these funds are not spent immediately, but 
instead added to its endowment so it can benefi t many cohorts of students. Second, 
sovereign wealth funds can play a stabilizing role by reducing the volatility of govern-
ment revenues. Countries that depend on commodities for the bulk of their exports 
can be whipsawed by shifts in prices, as, for instance, many oil exporters were in the 
mid-1980s and late 1990s. Finally, these funds can serve as holding companies, in 
which the government places its strategic investments. Public leaders may see fi t to 
invest in domestic or foreign fi rms for strategic purposes, and the sovereign funds 
provide a way to hold and manage these stakes.
The Mixed Legacy
Many nations have failed to save the wealth created by developing natural 
resources. Consider, for instance, the experience of Norway in the 1970s and 1980s 
(for more details, see Pope 1995; Gjedrem 2005). In the oil surge of those years, 
the government received a tremendous windfall of funds from its numerous rigs 
in the North Sea. While efforts were made to enact legislation that set aside money 
for the future, most of the money was spent immediately. Some of the spending 
benefi ted physical and social infrastructure: Norway rebuilt its excellent system 
of roads and bridges and provided free health care and higher education to all 
residents. But other expenditures were less benefi cial for long-term growth. For 
example, minimum wages were set extremely high, which rendered a number of 
economic sectors uncompetitive in global markets, and industries were subsidized. 
Much of the funding for industry was earmarked for dying sectors, such as ship-
building. This support allowed facilities to remain open for a few years more, but 
could not reverse the inexorable decline of such industries. Much of the funding 
for new ventures went to friends or relatives of parliamentarians or of the bureau-
crats responsible for allocating the funds. Moreover, Norway’s policy of aggressively 
spending the government’s petroleum revenues brought chaos to public and private 
fi nances when oil prices plunged in the mid-1980s. The government’s oil revenue 
dropped from about $11.2 billion in 1985—or about 20 percent of Norway’s gross 
domestic product—to $2.4 billion in 1988. The resulting retrenchment of public 
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spending and tightening of credit led numerous banks to fail, as well as bringing 
an unprecedented wave of bankruptcies by private citizens.
Nor was Norway the fi rst nation to struggle with the infl ux of wealth. Back in 
the 1970s, The Economist magazine coined the term “Dutch Disease” to describe 
the economic malaise that gripped the Netherlands when it experienced an infl ux 
of natural gas royalties during the 1960s. An example much further back in time, 
documented by historian David Landes (1998), would be the corrosive effects 
that the tremendous wealth generated by Spain’s overseas conquests had on that 
nation’s economy.
Sovereign wealth funds can address these downsides of a sudden accumula-
tion of natural wealth in two ways. First, by not spending the gains from natural 
resources (or other sources) immediately, but rather preserving them for future 
generations, the distorting impact of the windfall is reduced. Had the Norwegian 
government kept public spending in check during the 1970s and 1980s, it is 
unlikely that the disruptions in subsequent years would have been as severe. 
Second, earmarking a percentage of windfall revenues into an investment fund 
may reduce the risk that government offi cials will spend these revenues in an 
unwise or corrupt manner—assuming, of course, the sovereign fund is run in a 
professional manner. In an ideal world, a soundly managed sovereign fund can 
address some of the macroeconomic problems that an infl ux of funding may 
cause, such as infl ation and exchange rate overvaluation (see the discussion in 
Ang 2010 for an exploration of these issues).
But the structure of sovereign wealth funds can face two serious agency prob-
lems. First, the political process can introduce short-run pressures on sovereign 
wealth funds to fi nancially support local fi rms or subsidize industrial policies within 
the country. There are two opposing views of the consequences of these investment 
pressures. Advocates for government-directed investments often argue that fi nan-
cial markets in these countries can be underdeveloped or myopic or both, and thus 
leave profi table investment opportunities on the table (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; 
Stiglitz 1993). The opposing, less-sanguine view of politically directed investments 
suggests that political involvement can either lead to misguided policy attempts to 
prop up ineffi cient fi rms or industries or engage in investment activities in indus-
tries, sectors, or geographies that are “hot” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Banerjee 
1997; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997).
This conceptual framework suggests some testable implications. If the 
benevolent view of sovereign wealth funds is accurate, we would expect to fi nd that 
government investments in local fi rms are directed at industries that face fi nancial 
constraints and subsequently perform very well. If the latter view is true, we would 
predict the opposite: investments would be disproportionately directed to local 
fi rms, follow a pro-cyclical trend, and subsequently perform poorly. In addition, 
if sovereign wealth funds are run by politically connected but fi nancially inexperi-
enced managers, we might expect that not only would they make poor choices in 
their home and foreign investments, but would also display poorer stock-picking 
ability even looking solely at the international portfolio of the fund.
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Political Involvement and Investment Distortions
There has been relatively little empirical analysis of agency problems at sover-
eign funds, largely due to data restrictions.1 Recent papers by Gompers and Metrick 
(2001), Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007), and Hochberg and Rauh (2011) 
have highlighted the heterogeneity in investment strategies, and ultimately returns, 
across different types of institutional investors.2 Because we are interested in under-
standing the extent to which the investment behavior of sovereign wealth funds 
is shaped by short-term political considerations, we focus on the funds’ long-term 
investments—acquisitions, purchases of private equity, and structured equity posi-
tions in public fi rms — on the grounds that these distortions should be most evident 
in these areas.
Descriptive Statistics
To analyze the investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds, we combine 
data from a number of publicly available sources. Here, we offer an overview of the 
sources for this data: for details, please see the online Appendix available with this 
article at http://e-jep.org.
First, we look at information on the funds themselves, starting with profi les of 
the funds published by J.P. Morgan (Fernandez and Eschweiler 2008) and Preqin 
(Friedman 2008). The key variables collected at the fund level are assets under 
management, the presence of politicians in the managing bodies of the funds, reli-
ance on external managers, and whether the stated investment goals are “strategic.” 
By “strategic,” we mean that the investments are related to the country’s long-term 
industry development strategy rather than simply aiming to maximize the fi nancial 
returns of the portfolio. We categorize a fund as “strategic” if its stated investment 
goals are the management of the government’s physical assets, the acquisition of 
strategic assets, or domestic development. We categorize a fund as “nonstrategic” if 
its stated goals are investment of oil/commodity revenues, currency reserve manage-
ment, or pension funding. These measures of the characteristics of the funds are 
admittedly crude characterizations of organizational structures: these are recorded 
1 Several papers conduct event-study analyses of how the stock market reacts when sovereign wealth 
funds make investment announcements. The reactions are usually positive, at least in the short term 
(Kotter and Lel 2008; Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta 2010; Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, and Miracky 
2010; Knill, Lee, and Mauck 2010). Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) show that sovereign wealth funds 
largely invest in countries that share the same ethnicity, language, and religion. Fernandes (2011) and 
Dyck and Morse (2011), rather than exploring transactions, focus on holdings of sovereign wealth funds 
(that is, the stock rather than the fl ow of investments). The latter paper, which is most complementary 
to the analysis below, fi nds that many holdings by these funds can be explained by fi nancial return 
maximization or state planning motives, demonstrating the tension between the two objectives.
2 While the Santiago principles of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds state that 
“relevant fi nancial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed” (http://www.iwg-swf
.org/pubs/gapplist.htm; accessed December 22, 2012), consistent return data for most sovereign funds 
is hard to come by. For instance, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in recent annual reports has 
reported its aggregate returns over 20- and 30-year time horizons; aggregate returns over shorter hori-
zons have not been disclosed, much less those of individual asset classes.
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as binary variables, rather than as continuous variables that we might be able to 
analyze more carefully. Moreover, these measures are reported as of 2008: we do 
not have a time series on the governance structure or types of advisors involved in 
the funds.
Second, we examine the direct investments that the funds made, relying on 
reporting from Dealogic’s M&A Analytics, SDC’s Platinum M&A, and Bureau 
van Dijk’s Zephyr. Transactions included in the database encompass outright acqui-
sitions, venture capital and private equity investments, and structured minority 
purchases in public entities (frequently called PIPEs, or “private investments in 
public entities”). The databases do not include investments into hedge, mutual, 
or private equity funds or open market purchases of minority stakes in publicly 
traded fi rms.
Finally, we want to look at the investment climate around the time of the trans-
action and to measure investment performance. Because many investments are in 
private fi rms, price/earnings ratios determined in public equity markets are not 
available. As a proxy, we use the price/earnings ratios of fi rms traded in stock markets 
in the target company’s industry and nation, where the price/earnings ratios are 
weighted by the size of the fi rms in the industry. We construct this price/earnings 
measure both for the time when the sovereign wealth fund fi rst makes the acquisi-
tion, and for a year later, which give us an admittedly approximate performance 
measure for each deal.
The result of this process is a sample of 29 sovereign wealth funds that carried 
out 2,662 transactions between January 1984 and December 2007. The assets of 
these funds, $3.1 trillion, represent about 60 percent of the assets of sovereign 
wealth funds according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. The bulk of sover-
eign wealth funds that are not included are very new, very small, or have traditionally 
eschewed private equity investing (for example, the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund and China’s SAFE Investment Company).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for this sample. Panel A of Table 2 sorts 
the funds into three regions: seven funds in the Asian group, 15 funds in the Middle 
Eastern group, and seven funds in the Western group. The Western group includes 
funds from North America, Australia, and Europe. The sample of 2,045 transac-
tions by the Asian funds is substantially larger than the 533 observations in the 
Middle Eastern group and the 84 of the Western group.3 While the sample consists 
of transactions between the years 1984 and 2007, transactions are more common 
3 One possible explanation for these differences in sample size is that we have only partial coverage of 
the deals. We believe, however, that this can only explain part of the differences. More important, we 
believe, are the differences in fund sizes and the willingness to engage in direct investments. To estimate 
the coverage of our sample, we compare the aggregate transaction value of our sample to the estimate in 
a J.P. Morgan publication (Fernandez and Eschweiler 2008). They estimate outstanding investments by 
sovereign wealth funds in alternatives investments like hedge funds and private equity at the end of 2007 
as $316 billion. In our sample, the aggregate transaction value in the years 2003 –2007 (excluding the 
public investments) is $198 billion (expressed in 2008 US dollars). Given that we include direct private 
equity investments but exclude private equity partnerships and hedge fund investments while they include 
all three, the comparison suggests we have reasonable sample coverage.
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in recent years: more than half of the Asian group transactions, 60 percent of the 
Middle Eastern group transactions, and 90 percent of the Western group transac-
tions happened in the most recent fi ve years of the sample.
Panel B shows that the average transaction size is $158 million (in 2008 US 
dollars), although the median is much lower at $67 million. The average stake 
acquired by the sovereign wealth funds is a majority interest of 56.6 percent. The 
average price/earnings level in the industry-country-year of the target of a transac-
tion is 25.6, and the typical investment segment experiences a drop of – 1.2 percent 
in the mean price/earnings ratio in the year after the investment. For approxi-
mately 20 percent of the investments that occurred in publicly traded fi rms, we 
also examine the market-adjusted returns in the six months after the transaction 
(as discussed further below). Sovereign wealth funds have played an important role 
in private equity investing. 4
Panel C reports on the funds according to their governance structure. About 
24 percent of the funds (20 percent of transactions) have politicians involved in the 
fund, and 28 percent of the funds (10 percent of transactions) rely primarily on 
4 Over the years 2003 through 2007, the aggregate value of private equity transactions by sovereign 
wealth funds in our sample was $198 billion (excluding investments by sovereign wealth funds in private 
equity partnerships). Based on estimates of Stromberg (2008) and the Private Equity Council, invest-
ments by sovereign wealth funds account for approximately 9.5 percent of the aggregate value of global 
private equity deals over a similar time period.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Groups    
Funds Transactions
External 
managers (%) Politicians (%)
Average fund 
size in 2008 
(billions of dollars)
Asia group 7 2045 42.85 57.14 132.7
Middle East group 15 533 13.33 13.33 124.76
Western group 7 84 42.85 14.28 40.874
Panel B: Transactions 
N Mean Median Std. Dev
Acquisition stake (%) 1,998 56.59 50.00 39.01
Average deal size (million 2008$) 1,743 158.23 67.50 256.24
Home investment (%) 2,662 33.92 0.00 47.35
Region Investment (%) 2,662 29.70 0.00 45.70
P/E Level 2,642 25.60 21.46 13.48
P/E Change (%) 2,632 – 1.17 – 0.01 11.19
Market-adjusted Return 543 4.67 13.20 42.82
Continued
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outside managers. Both funds with political leaders and external managers tend to 
make larger investments. Interestingly, when politicians are involved, funds invest 
more in fi rms headquartered in the home country (45 percent of the deals in the 
sample) relative to funds without their involvement (only 31 percent of the trans-
actions). Funds with primarily external managers invest less in the home country 
(only 8 percent) relative to funds that do not rely on external managers (these 
invest 37 percent in the home country).
Table 2—continued
Panel C: Politicians and external managers
Politicians are 
involved in the 
management 
of the fund
Politicians are not 
involved in the 
management 
of the fund
External managers 
are involved in the 
management 
of the fund
External managers 
are not involved in the 
management 
of the fund
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Acquisition 
 stake (%)
366 49.16 40.03 1,625 58.35 50.75 203 42.19 20.00 1,788 58.31 51.00
Average deal 
 size (million 
 2008$)
378 190.07 72.49 1,367 147.86 66.01 219 236.41 85.48 1,526 145.62 64.82
Home 
 investment (%)
508 44.80 0.00 2,146 31.39 0.00 275 8.20 0.00 2,379 36.89 0.00
Region 
 Investment (%) 
508 31.80 0.00 2,146 29.32 0.00 275 44.02 0.00 2,379 28.17 0.00
P/E Level 506 25.29 21.66 2,128 25.70 20.51 272 19.68 21.52 2,362 25.57 21.46
P/E Change 
 (%)
502 – 2.62 – 0.01 2,122 – 0.82 – 0.01 269 2.48 0.00 2,355 – 0.82 – 0.01
Panel D: Funds’ stated investment objectives (Preqin 2008)
Investment of 
oil/commodity 
revenues
Currency
reserve 
management 
Pension 
funding
Management 
of government 
physical assets 
Acquisition of 
strategic assets 
Domestic 
development 
Number of funds 5 8 2 7 4 3
Number of 
 transactions
73 1833 34 460 722 178
Home 
 investment (%)
11 32 32 59 33 32
Notes: The sample consists of 2,662 investments by 29 sovereign wealth funds. It excludes transactions 
that were withdrawn or rejected. All descriptive statistics are equally weighted. P/E Level is the 
average of the price/earnings ratios of publicly traded fi rms in the industry, country, and year of 
the transaction. Region Investment equals 1 (100 percent) if investment was at the same region (Asia, 
Middle East, or Western countries) but not at home country. P/E Change is the change in the average 
of the price/earnings ratios of publicly traded fi rms in the industry and country of the transaction 
in the year after the deal. Market-adjusted Return is the difference between the return of the target in 
the six months after the transaction and the return of the corresponding benchmark over the same 
period. The deal size and the price/earnings ratio variables are winsorized.
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The fi nal panel of Table 2 reports the stated fund objectives. Currency reserve 
management is the objective associated with most funds and most transactions. 
Funds whose stated goal is the management of government physical assets have 
the largest share of domestic investments; those whose goal is the investment of 
oil/commodity revenues, the fewest.
Propensity to Invest at Home
We now document more systematically how the governance structures of sover-
eign wealth funds are associated with differences in their investment strategies. In 
particular, we investigate whether the involvement of external managers or that 
of politicians in investment management is correlated with outcomes. We analyze 
investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds looking at their propensity to invest 
at home, the industry-country price/earnings levels at the time of the investments, 
the subsequent changes in the price/earnings ratios, and the size of the acquisition 
stakes of their investments.
One of the important governance-related problems in the investment policies 
of sovereign wealth funds might be that their money is used to bail out under-
performing fi rms or industries. To analyze how funds vary in their allocation of 
investments between the home nation and outside, we estimate a probit model. The 
dependent variable is a home investment dummy, which equals one if the target 
investment is made within the home nation of the sovereign wealth fund and zero 
otherwise. In Table 3, we regress the home dummy on indicator variables for the 
presence of political leaders in the management of the fund and the reliance on 
external managers. (We cluster the standard errors at the level of the country where 
the sovereign wealth fund is based.) The displayed coeffi cients are marginal effects. 
In the specifi cations where year dummies are added, the sample only includes trans-
actions from 1991 onward.5
In the base specifi cation, we employ no controls. In the second and subsequent 
regressions, we control for the geographic location of the sovereign wealth fund 
(Asian, Middle Eastern, and Western). The results in the fi rst column show that 
in cases where political leaders are involved with the management of the funds, 
domestic investments are more common, while involvement of external managers is 
associated with fewer domestic investments. The magnitude of the effects is large: the 
coeffi cient on the politician dummy refl ects a 41.3 percent increase in the likelihood 
of investing at home when politicians are involved. In comparison, the coeffi cient on 
the external manager dummy is equivalent to a 27.3 percent lower share of domestic 
investments when external managers are employed.
5 Regressions are weighted by winsorized transaction sizes (expressed in 2000 US dollars). Since we only 
have sizes for 67 percent of our transactions, we impute missing weights by constructing the fi tted values 
from a regression of deal sizes on fi xed effects for the investment year, target industry, target region, 
and fund. After adding imputed observations, we winsorize the deal size variable at the 5 percent and 
95 percent level to reduce the effect of extreme observations.
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In column 2 of Table 3, we repeat the regression from column 1, but add 
measures of the price/earnings level of the sovereign wealth fund’s nation (Home 
P/E Level) and of the price/earnings level of the country in which the fund invests 
(Outside P/E Level). The results show that there is a signifi cant correlation between 
higher price/earnings levels in the other countries and a lower propensity to 
invest at home. An increase in one standard deviation of Outside P/E decreases 
Table 3
Sovereign Wealth Fund Behavior
Dependent variable
Home Dummy P/E Levels P/E Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Politicians  0.413***  4.153***  – 0.042***
(0.107) (1.300) (0.004)
External Managers – 0.273***  – 4.562***  0.023***
(0.058) (1.307) (0.007)
Home P/E  0.006**
(0.003)
Outside P/E  – 0.005*
(0.003)
Home Investment  – 5.607* – 0.017
(2.625) (0.013)
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
Sovereign wealth fund region dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Target region dummies No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.128 0.097 0.167 0.128
N 2,618 2,618 2,533 2,524
Notes: The sample consists of 2,662 investments by 29 sovereign wealth funds. It excludes transactions 
that were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variable Home Dummy is a dummy denoting whether 
the investment target was based in the same nation as the sovereign wealth fund; the dependent variable 
P/E Levels is the weighted (by fi rm value) average of the price/earnings ratios of publicly traded fi rms in 
the industry, country, and year of the transaction; the dependent variable P/E Change denotes a one year 
percentage change in the value of P/E Levels from the year of the transaction. External Managers is equal 
to 1 if external managers are involved in the management of the fund, zero otherwise. The Politicians 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if politicians are involved in the management of the fund. The Home P/E 
variable is the country-level P/E ratio of home country. The Outside P/E variable is equal to the target 
country P/E ratio if investment is not in the sovereign wealth fund’s home nation. If investment is 
at home, Outside P/E is equal to the average (weighted by the total transaction sizes of the sovereign 
wealth fund deals in the sample) P/E ratios of all other countries in which investments were made by 
sovereign wealth funds. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in 
the same country as the sovereign wealth fund. We include dummy variables for different regions, set 
equal to 1 when a fund or target is based in Asia or the Middle East. The estimation method in the fi rst 
two regressions is a weighted probit model and in the second pair is weighted ordinary least squares, 
using in both cases as weights winsorized transaction sizes (converted to 2000 US dollars). The displayed 
coeffi cients are marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sovereign wealth fund country. 
When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward.
***,**, and * indicate levels of signifi cance of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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the likelihood of investing at home by 3.11 percent, while that of Home P/E increases 
it by 4.5 percent.
The cross-sectional results suggest that sovereign wealth funds invest more 
at home if their local equity markets have relatively high price-to-earnings levels 
and similarly they are less likely to invest at home if foreign markets are valued 
highly. One possible explanation for this pattern might be that sovereign funds try 
“correctly” to invest in markets that have high option values, high price-to-value 
levels.6 But an alternative interpretation would be that they choose investments that 
are overvalued. Given the return dynamics which we present in the next section, 
it rather appears that the results are more consistent with sovereign wealth funds 
engaging in “trend chasing,” that is, they gravitate to markets where equity values 
have already been bid up highly.
Valuation Levels
In a second step, we examine whether there are signifi cant differences in 
the market timing of the transactions undertaken by sovereign wealth funds that 
have involvement of politicians compared to those run by professional managers. 
In the third column of Table 3, we rerun the same regression as before but the 
dependent variable is the weighted average (by fi rm value) of the price-to-earnings 
ratios of publicly traded fi rms in the industry, country, and year of the transaction. 
We fi nd that having politicians involved is strongly associated with investments in 
higher-priced sectors (a premium of three-to-four times earnings), while external 
managers are associated with investments in lower-valued sectors.
Investment Performance
To understand the propensity of sovereign wealth funds with political involve-
ment to invest in industries with high valuations as measured by price/earnings 
ratios, we now look at the later performance of these industries. On the one hand, 
investments in high price-to-earnings industries could be a sign that politicians 
favor industries with attractive investment opportunities as argued, for example, in 
Gordon (1959) and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007). On the other 
hand, investments in industries with high price-to-earnings ratios might suggest that 
sovereign wealth funds engage in trend chasing and buy into infl ated valuations, as 
discussed in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). If the fi rst interpretation is 
true, we should see that sovereign wealth funds outperform in home investments, 
while the opposite would hold under the second explanation.
The regression in the fourth column in Table 3 is structured to be parallel 
to the fi rst three columns, but now the dependent variable is the percentage 
change in the average price-to-earnings ratio of fi rms in that country and industry 
in the year following the investment. By looking at the subsequent performance 
6 High price to value means that the market values the company much higher than its assets in place. 
The only reason that is rational is if the market expects this fi rm to have great returns in the future. This 
is exactly the option value that is priced into the fi rm’s stock.
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of the sector, we can address some of the interpretative challenges highlighted 
above. As in the previous section, we use a transaction size-weighted ordinary least 
squares specifi cation.
We see here that sovereign wealth funds where political leaders play a role 
select sectors with signifi cant drops in price-to-earnings ratios going forward 
(– 4.2 percent). This is in contrast to the case when external managers are involved, 
where price-to-earnings values increase in the year following the investment 
(+ 2.3 percent).7 The analysis suggests that sovereign wealth funds with politician 
involvement do not select high price-to-earnings sectors because they have better 
private information about investment opportunities (as the fi nding of home bias in 
investments might initially suggest). Rather, it seems to refl ect a willingness to trend 
chase and overpay for investments. The analysis suggests, at least weakly, that these 
effects are stronger when it comes to domestic investments.
In unreported regressions, we verify that these results also hold if we use data 
at the deal level for the subset of fi rms that were publicly traded at the time of 
investment. We obtain the information from Datastream for all target companies 
that were publicly traded and calculate the cumulative abnormal returns relative to 
the local market benchmark in the six months after the transaction. We fi nd once 
again that in the basic specifi cations, politician-infl uenced sovereign wealth funds 
are associated with lower returns. These transactions signifi cantly underperform, 
generating 16 percent lower returns in the six months after the investments. The 
home investment dummy now has a signifi cantly negative coeffi cient, suggesting 
underperformance among domestic investments. While the sample of publicly 
traded transactions is considerably smaller, the similarity to the results reported in 
Table 3 is reassuring.8
Overall, our results lend support to the hypothesis that funds exposed to polit-
ical infl uences show major deviations from long-run return maximization. Sovereign 
wealth funds with politician involvement are more likely to invest domestically, while 
those sovereign wealth funds where external managers play an important role are 
more likely to invest internationally. Politically infl uenced sovereign wealth funds 
also concentrate their funds in sectors that both have high price-to-earnings levels 
7 When interactions with home investments are added in unreported regressions, the interaction term 
between politician infl uence and home investments is negative and signifi cant, refl ecting a decline of 
6.8 percent in returns when investing at home.
8 In an unreported regression, we also consider a benchmark that matches to the type of security. We use 
as the dependent variable the percentage change in the weighted (by fi rm value) average EBITDA/assets 
ratio of all publicly traded fi rms if the target is public, or if the target is private, all privately held fi rms in 
the corresponding three-digit SIC industry, country, and year of the target in the transaction. We deter-
mine the ratios for the corresponding fi rms from the 2009 edition of the Orbis database from Bureau 
van Dijk, which includes fi nancial information about private fi rms for many nations. The important 
advantage of Orbis is that it includes data on both public and private fi rms (in fact, most of the fi rms in 
this database are private). Unfortunately, in many cases, the information is quite scanty, so we can only 
obtain a ratio for the corresponding industry, country, and year for 796 fi rms — far fewer than for the 
price-to-earnings ratio, where we have a benchmark for 2,553 fi rms. The results are quite weak. In 
the basic regressions, the Politicians variable retains a negative coeffi cient and the External Managers a 
positive one, but neither are statistically signifi cant.
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and then experience a drop in these levels, especially in their domestic investments, 
patterns that do not hold in funds that rely on external managers. Political pressures 
seem to force these sovereign wealth funds to use their funds to support under-
performing local industries rather than build a savings buffer for the long run. 
The performance gap between domestic and international investments when more 
political appointees are on the board also supports the interpretation that politi-
cally connected managers are not purely making poor decisions when investing but 
that there is a strategic component.
Stated Investment Objective
Some sovereign wealth funds profess a desire to focus on more short-term stra-
tegic objectives, such as the acquisition of useful companies or domestic industrial 
development. Others aim more at the long-term return goals that are akin to those 
of a university endowment.
In Table 4, we repeat the analyses of Table 3, but look specifi cally at the role that 
investment objectives play. Recall that we defi ne funds’ objectives to be “strategic” 
if stated goals include management of government physical assets, acquisition of 
strategic assets, or domestic development. We consider the rest of the objectives as 
“nonstrategic” (investment of oil/commodity revenues, currency reserve manage-
ment, or pension funding).9 We employ the same sample, number of observations, 
and dependent variables as those reported in Table 3. The independent variables 
change slightly across the four regressions and we add the independent variable 
Strategic Objectives and as well as the interaction of Strategic Objectives with Politi-
cians (Politicians × Strategic Objectives). In the regression analyses of the decision 
to invest at home, we fi nd that when political leaders are involved, those funds 
that have strategic objectives show a signifi cantly higher probability of investing 
at home. Meanwhile, the coeffi cients on Strategic Objectives or Politicians as sepa-
rate variables are either insignifi cant or of reduced statistical signifi cance. In the 
other two regressions, the interaction between the strategic objective measure and 
politicians are insignifi cant. As before political leader–infl uenced investments are 
associated with high prices and subsequent underperformance regardless of their 
stated strategic objectives.
Robustness
One could be worried that our results might be driven either by some of the 
smaller deals or the valuation trends in the years immediately before the fi nancial 
crisis. Alternatively, one might worry that there is a sample selection bias, which 
is doubtless a greater problem among the smaller transactions. To verify that our 
9 Most funds include multiple goals, which typically fall under the same broad category. In 220 invest-
ments, fund goals included both strategic and nonstrategic objectives. We included all these transactions 
in the nonstrategic group, and verifi ed that results are similar when these are included in the strategic 
group instead.
Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar     233
results are robust to these concerns, we undertake a number of additional tests that 
examine different subsets of the data.
We repeated all the regressions presented in this paper using two subsamples, 
one which includes the largest 75 percent of the deals, and the other with the 
largest 50 percent of the deals. Even after removing the smaller half of the transac-
tions, the remaining transactions maintain the same distribution across the groups. 
And in both subsamples, the results remained similar to the ones reported in the 
paper. We also run the regressions without winsorizing the data (without trimming 
the outliers). We repeat our analysis excluding either the last two years or the last 
year of the sample and fi nd that the results remain unchanged. Finally, we conduct 
simple weighted mean tests and run unweighted regressions to explore the robust-
ness of the results. The results exhibit similar patterns to the ones described in the 
analyses above.
In short, our results lend support to the hypothesis that funds, which are 
exposed to political infl uences, show major distortions from long-run return maxi-
mization. Sovereign wealth funds with politician involvement are more likely to 
invest domestically, while those funds where external managers play an important 
role are more likely to invest internationally. Politically infl uenced sovereign wealth 
Table 4 
Investment Objectives
Dependent variable
Home Dummy P/E Levels P/E Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Politicians 0.192 0.199* 3.630*** – 0.038***
(0.128) (0.103) (0.900) (0.012)
Strategic Objectives – 0.086 – 0.069 2.261* – 0.015
(0.077) (0.154) (1.249) (0.009)
Politicians × Strategic Objectives 0.477*** 0.454* – 0.993 0.014
(0.176) (0.245) (2.504) (0.013)
External Managers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home P/E No Yes No No
Outside P/E No Yes No No
Home Investment No No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
Sovereign wealth fund region dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Target region dummies No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.142 0.014 0.169 0.128
N 2,618 2,618 2,533 2,524
Notes: The four regressions are very similar to those reported in Table 3. The main changes are the addition 
of Strategic Objectives and the interaction of Strategic Objectives with Politicians (Politicians × Strategic 
Objectives). Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the sovereign 
wealth funds are based, are shown in parenthesis.
***,**, and * indicate levels of signifi cance of 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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funds also concentrate their funds in sectors that both have high price/earnings 
levels and then experience a drop in these levels, especially in their domestic invest-
ments, while these patterns do not hold in funds that rely on external managers. 
Funds that have stated strategic goals are more likely to invest at home but only if 
politicians are involved.
Other Challenges: Transparency and Managing Growth
Although sovereign wealth funds have existed for six decades, they are facing 
increased political scrutiny in many nations both because of their accelerating 
growth and because of highly public transactions that drew them into the global 
spotlight, such as the $7.5 billion investment in Citigroup in November 2007 by 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. The controversies surrounding investments 
by sovereign funds are not new—witness the 1987 row over the Kuwait Investment 
Offi ce’s purchase of a 20 percent stake in British Petroleum—yet the intensity of 
scrutiny in recent years has been unprecedented and seems unlikely to subside. In 
part, these concerns can be attributed to intense anxiety in many established econo-
mies about globalization and the changing global balance of power. But these fears 
can also be understood as a reaction to the intense secrecy that surrounds some of 
the activities of sovereign wealth funds. Greater visibility—publicizing the size of the 
pools, investment strategies, and particular investments — could help dispel at least 
part of the worries over sovereign funds. While the International Working Groups of 
Sovereign Wealth Fund’s 2009 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) 
(“Santiago Principles”) spoke of the desirability of transparency along a variety of 
dimensions, actual compliance with these principles has been quite limited.
The reluctance of sovereign wealth funds regarding disclosure may have 
two roots. First, too much disclosure can have real costs, since it can lead to increased 
imitation by other investors. The experience of American university endowments 
offers a useful object lesson here. In the past, a substantial lag typically occurred 
between the time a few university endowments fi rst began investing in an asset class 
and the time other institutions followed. For instance, many of the Ivy League schools 
began investing in venture capital in the early 1970s, but most corporate and public 
pensions did not follow until the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. More recently, such 
lags are much shorter. Within a couple of years of Harvard’s initiating a program to 
invest in forestland, for instance, many other institutions adopted similar initiatives. 
In general, an investment by a prominent institution can trigger a rush of capital 
seeking to gain access to the same type of investment, thus, making it much harder 
for the investor to continue what might otherwise have been a successful strategy 
(for a further discussion of these issues, see World Economic Forum 2011).
Furthermore, even an aggressive policy of encouraging transparency will not 
solve all of the challenges that sovereign wealth funds face. Investment decisions 
that would seem unremarkable when made by an individual or institutional investor 
can become political hot potatoes when undertaken by a sovereign fund. Consider, 
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for instance, the experience of Norway’s Government Pension Fund when the 
fund trimmed its portfolio of fi rms using child labor and thus sold $400 million 
of Wal-Mart stock (based on reports that Wal-Mart was selling goods that had been 
produced in other countries for the fi rm using child labor). This decision triggered 
a diplomatic row with the American ambassador, who accused Norway of passing 
“essentially a national judgment on the ethics of the [company]” (as reported in 
Landler 2007). The fund pointed out that when it had shared with Wal-Mart its draft 
report presenting evidence about the company’s labor practices, Wal-Mart ignored 
it. (For an overview of the dispute, see Pozen 2007). Similarly, when Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund, along with many hedge funds, sold short the shares 
of Icelandic banks in 2006, it triggered a major diplomatic row with that nation (as 
reported in The Economist, 2008).
Another major challenge that sovereign wealth funds must address is how to 
ensure attractive investment returns as they grow. Strategies that work for a modest-
sized institution may be diffi cult to scale up into a larger organization. For instance, 
it may be possible for a billion-dollar endowment to generate attractive returns from 
investments of $10 million apiece in private equity funds or in developing markets. 
If a sovereign fund with 100 times the capital were to pursue a similar strategy, 
it would probably 1) be unable to fi nd enough attractive investments to have a 
return that signifi cantly boosts that of the overall fund; or 2) fi nd that purchases 
of larger blocks of stock affect the market price to the extent that the strategy is far 
less profi table. For similar reasons, many university endowments have struggled to 
maintain their success as they have become larger. Thus, for the larger sovereign 
funds, generating attractive returns is by no means simple.
Sovereign wealth funds have adopted a range of approaches to deal with this 
issue. At one extreme is the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund, which allocates 
almost no capital into alternative assets (private equity, hedge funds, or real estate 
investment) or illiquid markets. Instead the fund mainly invests into liquid and 
very transparent investments —like public debt and equity markets  —outside of the 
home country.
 This strategy minimizes the requirements on specialized knowledge of the 
investment staff and might allow the fund to maintain returns as it grows in size. 
At the other extreme are sovereign wealth funds like Temasek from Singapore 
that have heavily invested in private deals either via allocations to private equity 
or through direct investments in companies, often in other Asian economies. This 
latter strategy places much higher requirements on the investment offi ce. Particu-
larly in asset classes such as private equity and real estate, where funds and strategies 
often do not scale well, such strategies might ultimately be more diffi cult to continue 
as a fund grows in size.
Is there a way to overcome the diseconomies of scale that can drag down the 
returns of large institutional investors? One approach that the Government Invest-
ment Corporation of Singapore has tried has been to build an organizational 
structure in which a number of subsidiaries are managed separately. In this way, 
managers can make smaller investments. Such separate funds can also serve as 
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“laboratories”: successful approaches can be emulated by the other funds, while 
mistakes can be less costly since they affect only one subsidiary. It is an open research 
question whether such approaches allow sovereign wealth funds to continue to 
invest successfully as they grow.
■ We thank Harvard Business School’s Division of Research for fi nancial assistance and 
various seminar audiences and Timothy Taylor for helpful comments. Parts of this essay 
are adapted from Lerner (2009). Chris Allen and Jacek Rycko provided excellent research 
assistance.
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